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SANFORD K. AIN
District of Columbia
KRAMER v.
KRAMER,
1996 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 1205 (March 13, 1996)
Overview: Wife awarded $831,000 in
legal fees and expenses during the pendency of divorce case,
where Husband had no assets in his
name, yet
he used and controlled various trusts, corporations, and offshore
entities containing millions of dollars and had engaged in oppressive
and burdensome
tactics to frustrate Wife's discovery and access to information.
KREUZ v. KREUZ,
354 A.2d 867 (DC 1976)
Overview: Trial court properly awarded
wife alimony pendente lite without considering the merits where the
divorce complaint stated
a cause of
action and was filed in good faith.
HAMEL v. HAMEL, 489 A.2d 471 (DC 1985)
Overview: The lower court did not abuse
its discretion by ordering a non-custodial parent to meet with a court-designated
psychiatrist
before
setting a visitation schedule, nor did the lower court improperly
delegate responsibility to determine visitation.
EAST
v. EAST, 536 A.2d 1103 (DC 1987)
Overview: Where there was evidence on both sides of issue of
whether there was common-law marriage between parties to separation
action,
trial court's finding of such marriage was not disturbed. Trial
court had broad
discretion in reconsidering child support.
SANFORD
K. AIN
Virginia
SCOTT v. RUTHERFOORD, 30 Va. App. 176 (1999)
Overview: The circuit court, as the divorce court, did not
err in amending a final order more than 21 days after
its entry, because the divorce
court had continuing jurisdiction to revise its decrees
concerning the custody and maintenance of minor children.
SANFORD
K. AIN
Maryland
MELROD v. MELROD, 83 Md. App. 180 (1990)
Overview: Monetary, alimony, and counsel fees awards
in a final divorce order were improper when
the trial court misconstrued
Maryland law
in classifying property as marital or non-marital
and abused its discretion in valuing the property.
MARK S. CARLIN
District of Columbia
KRAMER v. KRAMER, 1996 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 1205 (March 13, 1996)
Overview: Wife awarded $831,000 in legal fees and expenses during the
pendency of divorce case, where Husband had no assets in his name, yet
he used and controlled various trusts, corporations, and offshore entities
containing millions of dollars and had engaged in oppressive and burdensome
tactics to frustrate Wife's discovery and access to information.
IN
RE ESTATE OF BURLESON, 738 A.2d 1199 (DC 1999)
Overview: A prior will was revoked upon the execution of a later will
and, assuming revocation of the later will, there was no evidence presented
suggesting that the deceased had revived the prior will.
ESTATE OF REAP v. MALLOY, 727 A.2d 326 (DC 1999)
Overview: Summary judgment was improper where a genuine dispute existed
as to whether husband and wife entered into a property settlement agreement
upon their divorce, such that wife's will making husband her beneficiary
could have been impliedly revoked.
JONES v. HOWARD UNIVERSITY, 589 A.2d 419 (DC 1991)
Overview: Mother who underwent diagnostic x-ray and surgery while
pregnant could recover under zone of danger theory for severe and
verifiable
mental distress if the jury believed the procedures presented a
threat to her
health or that of her unborn twins.
TYDINGS v. TYDINGS, 567 A.2d 886 (DC 1989)
Overview: The trial court had discretion
to require the ex-husband to pay any portion of the ex-wife's attorney
and witness fees
even though
the ex-wife became a very wealthy woman as a result of
the marital property distribution.
EAST v. EAST, 536 A.2d 1103 (DC 1988)
Overview: Where there was evidence on both sides of issue of
whether there was common-law marriage between parties to
separation action,
trial court's finding of such marriage was not disturbed.
Trial court had broad
discretion in reconsidering child support.
MARK
S. CARLIN
Maryland
In Re Midlen_Md._ (2006)
Overview: Attorney discipline case.
DIEP v. RIVAS, 357 Md. 668 (2000)
Overview: Murderer's survivors were entitled to receive
insurance benefits because policy directed payment
to murderer's survivors
and they were
not disqualified under slayer's rule since they were
not claiming through murderer.
BEYNON v. MONTGOMERY CABLEVISION LTD. 351 Md. 460 (1998)
Overview: Pre-impact fright, a form of mental or emotional
disturbance or distress, that was suffered by an
automobile accident victim
who died instantly upon impact was a legally compensable
element of damages
in
a survival action.
BENNETT
HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING v. NATIONSBANK,
342 Md. 169 (1996)
Overview:
That the bank and the developers had
agreed on a "friendly
foreclosure" in order to extinguish
the claims of junior lienors was an insufficient
allegation,
without
evidence
of fraud or misrepresentation,
to have the foreclosure sale set aside.
CRAWFORD v. LEAHY, 326 Md. 160 (1992)
Overview: A patient could not partially reject
an arbitration panel's malpractice award
and bring an action contesting
only the damages
portion of the award. The patient's action
to nullify the award had to present
both issues of liability and damages.
DIEP v. RIVAS, 126 Md. App. 133 (1999)
Overview: Because under the Slayer rule,
appellants' brother never acquired
any interest in the
proceeds under the insurance
policies,
appellants,
as secondary beneficiaries, had no
interest to assert in the proceeds.
MONTGOMERY CABLEVISION LTD. PSHP. v.
BEYNON, 116 Md. App. 363 (1997)
Overview: Damages for pre-impact
fright were improper in survival
action arising
from automobile
accident
where
death was instant
upon impact
because victim could not have suffered
any injury capable of objective
determination as
a result
of pre-impact
fright.
BENNETT
HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING
v. NATIONSBANK of Maryland,
103 Md. App. 749
(1995)
Overview: A contractor and
subcontractors that were not
parties to foreclosure
proceedings were permitted
nevertheless
to challenge
a
judgment if they
established that the judgment
was procured by fraud.
ANNE
MARIE
JACKSON
Maryland
DUFFY v. DUFFY ,
881 A.2d 630 (D.C.2005)
Overview: When they sparated, several years before their divorce, the parties entered an agreement in the form of a counter-signed letter. When it entered the final divorce decree, the trial court held that the parties had an enforceable contract. The appellate court affirmed the trial court finding that all essential terms of the contract were present and it was clear the parties meant to be bound by it.
HERRICK
v.
WAIN,
154 Md. App. 222 (2003)
Overview:
In
grandparent
visitation
case,
the
court
considered and
applied
the
relevant
factors
outlined
in
Fairbanks
v.
McCarter
and
fashioned
a
visitation
schedule
that
served
the
best
interests
of
the
children;
therefore,
father’s
due
process
rights
as
a
parent
have
not been
abrogated. |
