MARK S. CARLIN
District of Columbia


KRAMER v. KRAMER, 1996 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 1205 (March 13, 1996)

Overview: Wife awarded $831,000 in legal fees and expenses during the pendency of divorce case, where Husband had no assets in his name, yet he used and controlled various trusts, corporations, and offshore entities containing millions of dollars and had engaged in oppressive and burdensome tactics to frustrate Wife's discovery and access to information.IN RE ESTATE OF BURLESON, 738 A.2d 1199 (DC 1999)
Overview: A prior will was revoked upon the execution of a later will and, assuming revocation of the later will, there was no evidence presented suggesting that the deceased had revived the prior will.

IN RE ESTATE OF BURLESON, 738 A.2d 1199 (DC 1999)

Overview: A prior will was revoked upon the execution of a later will and, assuming revocation of the later will, there was no evidence presented suggesting that the deceased had revived the prior will.

ESTATE OF REAP v. MALLOY, 727 A.2d 326 (DC 1999)

Overview: Summary judgment was improper where a genuine dispute existed as to whether husband and wife entered into a property settlement agreement upon their divorce, such that wife's will making husband her beneficiary could have been impliedly revoked.

JONES v. HOWARD UNIVERSITY, 589 A.2d 419 (DC 1991)

Overview: Mother who underwent diagnostic x-ray and surgery while pregnant could recover under zone of danger theory for severe and verifiable mental distress if the jury believed the procedures presented a threat to her health or that of her unborn twins.

TYDINGS v. TYDINGS, 567 A.2d 886 (DC 1989)

Overview: The trial court had discretion to require the ex-husband to pay any portion of the ex-wife's attorney and witness fees even though the ex-wife became a very wealthy woman as a result of the marital property distribution.

EAST v. EAST, 536 A.2d 1103 (DC 1988)

Overview: Where there was evidence on both sides of issue of whether there was common-law marriage between parties to separation action, trial court's finding of such marriage was not disturbed. Trial court had broad discretion in reconsidering child support.

MARK S. CARLIN
Maryland

In Re Midlen_Md._ (2006)

Overview: Attorney discipline case
DIEP v. RIVAS, 357 Md. 668 (2000)

Overview: Murderer's survivors were entitled to receive insurance benefits because policy directed payment to murderer's survivors and they were not disqualified under slayer's rule since they were not claiming through murderer.

BEYNON v. MONTGOMERY CABLEVISION LTD. 351 Md. 460 (1998)

Overview: Pre-impact fright, a form of mental or emotional disturbance or distress, that was suffered by an automobile accident victim who died instantly upon impact was a legally compensable element of damages in a survival action.

BENNETT HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING v. NATIONSBANK, 342 Md. 169 (1996)

Overview: That the bank and the developers had agreed on a "friendly foreclosure" in order to extinguish the claims of junior lienors was an insufficient allegation, without evidence of fraud or misrepresentation, to have the foreclosure sale set aside.

CRAWFORD v. LEAHY, 326 Md. 160 (1992)

Overview: A patient could not partially reject an arbitration panel's malpractice award and bring an action contesting only the damages portion of the award. The patient's action to nullify the award had to present both issues of liability and damages.

DIEP v. RIVAS, 126 Md. App. 133 (1999)

Overview: Because under the Slayer rule, appellants' brother never acquired any interest in the proceeds under the insurance policies, appellants, as secondary beneficiaries, had no interest to assert in the proceeds.

MONTGOMERY CABLEVISION LTD. PSHP. v. BEYNON, 116 Md. App. 363 (1997)

Overview: Damages for pre-impact fright were improper in survival action arising from automobile accident where death was instant upon impact because victim could not have suffered any injury capable of objective determination as a result of pre-impact fright.

BENNETT HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING v. NATIONSBANK of Maryland, 103 Md. App. 749 (1995)

Overview: A contractor and subcontractors that were not parties to foreclosure proceedings were permitted nevertheless to challenge a judgment if they established that the judgment was procured by fraud.